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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this review was to examine the academic literature 
regarding self-exclusion as a form of harm minimisation in gambling and 
consider views from gambling operators and treatment providers. The extant 
literature was limited in that most studies were completed more than five ago; 
related specifically to a particular product or jurisdiction; relied on weak 
research designs and drew from self-selected samples. There were however 
some consistent findings indicating that in order to improve effectiveness, 
self-exclusion protocols should be: actively yet strategically promoted; quick 
and simple to implement; administered by attentive, well-trained staff; 
attracting sufficient investment in resources and technology to improve 
enforcement; and comprehensive rather than isolated in coverage (where 
feasible). Programmes should also be subject to robust evaluation and 
regulatory expectations should be detailed and specific rather than open to 
interpretation and general. Further scoping of the feasibility of multi-operator 
self-exclusion schemes (MOSES) was identified as a priority for future work.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Enabling gamblers to remove themselves from the gambling situation 
(operationally referred to as ‘voluntary self-exclusion’) is the most restrictive 
of harm minimisation measures. There is mixed support for the usefulness of 
self-exclusion. Some suggest that it is an important component of a public 
health response to minimising gambling related-harm (Gainsbury, 2013), 
whereas others (Productivity Commission, 2010) identify it as a reactive, 
inflexible approach primarily facilitating abstinence rather than control.  
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Our ability to control our behaviour is determined by our personal goals, 
our motivations, the feedback we receive about our behaviour and our ‘self-
regulatory resources’ (i.e., our reserves of ‘willpower’, and how quickly it 
becomes depleted) (Vohs, Baumeister, Ciarocco, 2005; Vohs, Baumeister, & 
Tice, 2008). Considered in these terms, self-exclusion has traditionally been 
the ‘last resort’ when other approaches to facilitate player control fail. 
Operators can help to facilitate self-control by providing timely behavioural 
feedback, limit-setting options, and restricting access to additional funds. 
However, if self-control still breaks down, operators can remove the need to 
rely on a player’s ‘self-regulatory resources’ by denying access to their 
gambling products. This option requires ceasing gambling altogether 
(depending on which gambling opportunities are covered in the agreement). 
However, restrictions on gambling access are now being used more creatively 
and more flexibly to promote responsible gambling to a wider range of 
gamblers (Griffiths, Wood, Parke, 2009). 
The form of self-exclusion agreements varies considerably according to 
product, operator, venue, sector, channel and jurisdiction. Key variations in 
form include whether: 
 
• provision and promotion is voluntary or mandatory; 
• agreements are enforced on a site-specific or operation-wide basis; 
• agreements are revocable; 
• duration of agreement is brief, long-lasting or permanent;  
• customers are removed from all promotion and mailing lists; 
• information regarding treatment and support is provided; 
• winnings may be confiscated in the event of a breach (e.g., 
disentitlement); 
• third parties can enact a self-exclusion agreement; 
• agreements only apply to certain products under certain conditions 
and; 
• agreements should be legally binding contracts with sanctions for 
breaches by either/both parties.  
 
The existing literature will only make a limited contribution to current 
academic, operational and regulatory challenges in Great Britain regarding 
self-exclusion for the following reasons: 
 
• The majority of the research studies were completed over five years 
ago. Gambling generally, and self-exclusion specifically, are 
influenced by changes in technology (e.g., more opportunities to 
circumvent the agreement; more opportunities for sharing and 
managing central lists between operators).  
• Most studies focus on large, destination resort style casinos. 
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• None of the studies draw their samples from gamblers in Great 
Britain. 
• Most studies consider agreements relating to land-based and not 
remote operations. 
• Most studies did not use a control group and consequently any impact 
cannot be causally attributed to the self-exclusion intervention (i.e., 
gamblers might have improved naturally even in the absence of 
undertaking self-exclusion). 
• Most studies used samples which were self-selected (i.e., the sample 
may not be representative of all self-excluders) and relied on self-
report data (inaccurate or biased recall).  
• Finally, it is not clear from the research what gambling alternatives 
were available. For example, greater accessibility to gambling (remote 
or land-based) will be likely to undermine a self-exclusion agreement 
with one venue or provider. 
 
The aim of this review is to provide a review of current understanding of 
the nature and effectiveness of self-exclusion as a form of harm minimisation 
in gambling. This article: 
 
1. Examines the academic literature regarding self-exclusion as harm 
minimisation in gambling; 
2. Considers views from two key stakeholders: gambling operators and 
treatment professionals who operate in Great Britain.  
 
This review will be useful for a broad range of stakeholders including 
industry, regulators, treatment professionals and researchers. This review 
extends to consider operational and regulatory issues through identifying 
priority areas for research and offering initial guidance on how existing 
research findings could be applied in operator-based approaches to self-
exclusion. While this review has been written with the British context in 
mind, we consider that most issues will have some relevance beyond Great 
Britain. 
 
2 METHOD 
 
Academic literature reviewed in this report was identified in three 
concurrent phases: a search of online electronic databases; grey literature 
accessed through web-based searches, personal knowledge and professional 
contacts; and through ‘snowballing‘, where references within other academic 
papers are pursued (Greenhalgh & Peacock, 2005).  
Academic databases searched included: Academic Search Elite, Business 
Source Complete, PsychArticles, PsychInfo, Science Direct and Scopus. In 
addition, generalist web search engines (Google, and subsequently Google 
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Scholar) were also used to identify relevant grey literature or technical reports 
not subject to traditional peer-review processes. Other relevant literature has 
also been considered using a similar approach where an appropriate link has 
been made with self-exclusion. 
While the theoretical basis for using self-exclusion as a form of harm 
minimisation is discussed in this report, the RGSB’s Self-Exclusion Working 
Group1 believed that it was also important to obtain a practical understanding 
of the operational issues from those working in the gambling industry and a 
better understanding of the clinical and practical issues from those working in 
treatment organisations. Views on these issues were expected to provide 
additional insight to supplement that provided in the academic literature.  
Throughout our review of the academic literature, examples of the 
qualitative responses from the stakeholder surveys are provided to support or 
contest the findings. These responses are not representative of the stakeholder 
group as a whole, rather they are the viewpoints of the individuals who chose 
to respond to the survey. However, they do provide a useful perspective and 
add useful context to the on-going debate around self-exclusion. Data in the 
dialogue boxes were derived from the Treatment Providers Survey and 
Operators Surveys. 
It is important at the outset to stress the limitations of the qualitative 
approach employed in both of these exploratory stakeholder surveys. Samples 
for both surveys are small, self-selected and are not necessarily representative 
of treatment providers or gambling operators generally. The purpose of these 
two exploratory surveys was not to provide ’evidence’ but rather to provide 
indicative perspectives through rich description and professional insight 
which may not have been recently captured elsewhere in relation to the British 
context. Due to constraints on time and budget, brief convenience samples 
were employed as a ‘first-step’ to better understanding the attitudes and 
concerns of these two stakeholder groups. For this reason, cautious 
consideration should be given to the qualitative data presented here, while 
acknowledging that the data are not necessarily representative of all gambling 
operators and treatment providers. Large scale representative surveys would 
be required if conclusions were to be drawn regarding proportions of 
responses from each stakeholder group, and  we do not currently consider that 
obtaining a reliable sense of such proportions is a priority for research in self-
exclusion. Frequencies of responses highlighted in the two tables that follow 
are indicative and are used primarily to summarise the open-ended responses 
in a concise and accessible way. 
 
 
1 The Responsible Gambling Strategy Board (RGSB) set up an expert working group 
called the Self-Exclusion Working Group (SEWG) in order to gather evidence and 
plan future work activity relating to self-exclusion. 
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2.1 Gambling operator perspectives 
 
Table 1 is a summary table of the themes of open-ended responses from a 
survey sent out to some of the largest gambling operators that serve residents 
in Great Britain. The open-ended format to the survey questions yielded 
qualitative data and these have been presented thematically in the main body 
of the report. It is worth reiterating that these findings are indicative and offer 
limited value from a quantitative perspective, given the small self-selected 
sample. For each question, responses have been grouped into themes, and the 
frequency with which these themes have been endorsed is then indicated by 
the number of asterisks (i.e., **** denotes four different operators making a 
similar point in their responses). 
 
Table 1. Response Summaries for Gambling Operators Survey 
Principle Response Themes from Open-ended Survey Response Data 
The availability of 
self-exclusion should 
be actively promoted 
in the venue or on the 
website. 
Yes, it should be actively 
promoted 
It should be 
easily accessible 
and clearly 
visible  
Encouraged, where 
appropriate, as a 
part of broader 
responsible 
gambling 
messaging  
  
*********** ********* ****   
Self-exclusion 
agreements should be 
irrevocable over the 
agreed time frame. 
Yes, with no exceptions  Revocable after 
6-12 months   
Revocable after 
interview with 
staff   
Yes, but with 
stricter interaction 
requirements 
****************** **** ** * 
No marketing should 
be permitted to 
customers during the 
self-exclusion period. 
Yes Yes, but some 
untargeted 
marketing (e.g., 
billboards, 
affiliate 
marketing) is 
hard to control  
Yes, but there will 
be mistakes at 
times 
 
***** ***** ***** ***** 
** 
** *   
Referrals should be 
made to third party 
organisations that can 
offer support, 
information and 
treatment for 
excluders where 
appropriate. 
Yes, they are given 
information (not a direct 
referral by staff)  
No, this should 
be the customer’s 
choice 
Third party support 
may not be 
appropriate but 
information is 
given if requested  
GambleAware™ 
details should also 
be given 
***** ***** ***** ***** 
*** 
* * * 
Up-to-date training on 
managing the self-
exclusion process 
should be provided to 
the appropriate staff. 
Yes Yes, all staff get 
self-exclusion 
training 
Yes, all customer-
facing staff 
Senior managers 
or dedicated 
teams get in-depth 
training 
************* ****** ***** ** 
The customer's 
account should be 
locked upon initiating 
any exclusion 
agreement and any 
Yes Not relevant 
(e.g., land-based) 
Access is given to 
allow funds to be 
withdrawn 
  
******************* *** *   
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Table 1. Response Summaries for Gambling Operators Survey 
Principle Response Themes from Open-ended Survey Response Data 
available funds are 
paid out to the 
customer. 
Options should be 
provided to customers 
to exclude by different 
types of gambling 
offered by the same 
operator. 
No blanket approach 
favoured to offer 'complete 
protection' from harm 
Yes Too difficult or 
resource intensive 
(usually land-
based) 
May only be 
suitable to some 
customers 
  *********** ********* **** * 
Options should be 
provided to customers 
to exclude across 
remote and land-
based operations of 
the same operator 
(where applicable). 
Yes Not Applicable If customer 
requests 
(extending to 
different channels 
should not be 
automatic)  
Difficult 
enforcing from 
remote to shop 
  ********* ****** **** ** 
Options should be 
provided to exclude 
across multiple 
operators (remote or 
land-based)? 
Supportive but considered 
not currently feasible  
Yes, but also 
given the option 
to close just one 
account  
Yes Each operator 
should be 
responsible for 
managing their 
own player 
exclusions 
******************* ** ** * 
Options should be 
made available for 
considering third 
party self-exclusion 
(i.e., a request made 
by a concerned 
significant other). 
Taken into consideration 
but no direct action 
Too many 
challenges (legal 
and data 
protection in 
particular)  
Do not agree Yes 
************ ***** ***** *** 
The effectiveness of 
self-exclusion 
programmes should 
be evaluated on a 
regular basis. 
Yes Yes, but difficult 
to measure  
We do not 
currently do this 
 
  ******************* ***** **   
Penalties should be 
imposed on the 
customer in the case 
of a breach. 
No, not feasible/too 
difficult to enforce 
No, unfair to 
customer 
Yes Winnings should 
be confiscated 
********* ***** ***** **** 
Penalties should be 
imposed on the 
operator in the case of 
a breach. 
No Yes, if operator 
wilfully 
disregards 
agreement (e.g., 
knowingly 
accepts excluded 
players) 
Unfair as 
appropriate 
technology is not 
available  
Already exists in 
licensing 
conditions 
  ******** ***** **** *** 
The minimum 
duration for a self-
exclusion agreement 
should be six months. 
Yes Optimum period 
is unknown 
Shorter, more 
flexible durations 
should also be 
offered 
At least one year 
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Table 1. Response Summaries for Gambling Operators Survey 
Principle Response Themes from Open-ended Survey Response Data 
  **************** *** *** *** 
The minimum 
duration for a self-
exclusion agreement 
should be flexible and 
defined by the player. 
Minimum six months but 
over six months should be 
flexible 
No Yes More flexibility 
would place 
greater pressure 
on resources 
  ******* ****** ***** *** 
Should players be 
reinstated 
automatically at the 
end of the term of the 
exclusion period or 
should the operator 
engage with the player 
to gauge 
appropriateness of a 
return before any 
reinstatement? 
Staff-customer interaction 
should be required first  
(e.g., 'positive action' letter 
confirming they no longer 
have a problem; an 
interview with staff) 
Automatic 
reinstatement  
but play (e.g. 
limits) and 
marketing should 
be controlled  
Automatic 
reinstatement 
An objective 
assessment of 
vulnerability 
should made 
before reinstating 
*************** **** *** ** 
Following 
reinstatement, should 
players be monitored 
by the operator, to 
assess ongoing risk or 
vulnerability? If yes, 
how should this be 
done? 
Monitor risky play (using 
behavioural analytics or 
staff monitoring) 
Yes Responsible 
gambling tools 
suggested or 
mandated 
Ongoing 
monitoring is not 
feasible 
  *********** ***** ***** *** 
Should a request for 
self-exclusion take 
immediate effect, or 
should there be a 24-
hour cooling off 
period? Does it 
depend on product or 
channel? 
Self-exclusion should take 
immediate effect 
There should be 
a 24-hour 
cooling-off 
period 
There should be 
staff/customer 
interaction to 
explain the process 
to ensure the 
customer 
understand what is 
involved 
   *************** ******* *   
Should players have 
the option to request 
self-exclusion without 
having to interact with 
customer services or 
come into the venue 
(land-based)? 
Yes No, customer 
service 
interaction is 
useful for 
determining real 
reason for 
excluding 
No, the customer 
needs to fully 
understand what 
the agreement 
entails 
No, presenting 
valid 
identification is 
required 
  ************* ****** ***** ** 
If you have any other 
comments in relation 
to self-exclusion in 
Great Britain, please 
include these here: 
Additional themes included: 
 
1. Self-exclusion is only part of the answer                                                                  
“The clue is in the title, ‘self’.  Self-exclusion cannot be effective for someone who does 
not want to comply, it can help those who genuinely want help.  It is a step for an 
individual who is recognising they have a problem, it cannot be the solution for an 
addict. It’s very hard to develop an effective nationwide scheme because it needs so 
many other parties to take part (e.g. ,banks) and other trade parties AGCs etc. However, 
we should always try and improve what we do.”        
                   
“The key word to me has always been ‘self’. Strategies should be developed on the belief 
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Table 1. Response Summaries for Gambling Operators Survey 
Principle Response Themes from Open-ended Survey Response Data 
that we are working to support customers who genuinely wish to control their gambling 
and not restricted on the basis of what may go wrong with the other occupational 
excluders or chancers.”                                                                                                                           
 
“It cannot be helpful to problem gamblers to present exclusion as a complete solution.  
It is simply never going to be that and it should not, in our view, be presented as a way 
to ensure someone never gambles again and a solution to their problem.” 
 
“As above, we believe the SE system has merit but is not the sole solution.  Equally, it is 
not accurate to say all self-exclusions represent those with pathological or serious 
gambling problems.   We place equal merit on working with customers to limit their play 
or visits, believing it can be better to play in a location where they are known and 
supported, rather than exclude them so they then go somewhere else where they are not 
so protected.”  
 
2. Industry sharing of experiences  
“An industry funded website or forum may have merits for individuals to share 
experiences and fears and promote suggestions as to how they could have been helped 
more under the particular set of circumstances that they encountered.” 
  
Notes: Some operators made more than one point and some made no points or did not have sufficient explanation 
to warrant inclusion; so frequencies do not necessarily total to 26 responses for each question. Some categories 
are not mutually exclusive but arranged in the most descriptive and useful way to represent subtle differences in 
responses. 
 
 
A large majority of gambling operators responding to the survey 
supported the following principles of best practice in self-exclusion: 
 
• agreements should be irrevocable; 
• marketing should not be permitted during the self-exclusion period; 
• Information on third party support and treatment should be provided; 
• all staff involved in self-exclusion should have regular, up-to-date 
training; 
• options should be provided to exclude across multiple operators 
(provided barriers can be overcome); 
• provision should be evaluated on a regular basis; 
• penalties to either operator or customer were inadequate for 
improving enforcement; 
• reinstating access following the end of an agreement should not be 
automatic but should involve either initial interaction with staff or 
ongoing monitoring of account to assess risk; 
• requests to exclude should take immediate effect. 
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Table 2: Response Summaries for Treatment Providers Survey 
Question Categories 
Overall to what 
extent has self-
exclusion been 
effective in assisting 
people to address 
their gambling 
dependency or to 
help them control 
their gambling? 
Land-based 
less effective 
(e.g., no 
membership 
scheme or 
monitoring; 
staff happy to 
reinstate; 
limited options 
on lottery 
products) 
Multi-
operator 
exclusion 
needed – 
self-
exclusion 
agreements 
are too easy 
to 
circumvent 
Certain sectors 
more vigilant 
than others 
(limited 
specificity) 
Too much 
advertising 
and 
marketing 
material 
More effective to 
use a filter (e.g., 
Gamblock) 
Ineffective 
– duration 
not long 
enough 
Self-
exclusion 
difficult 
when 
gambling is 
an integral 
part of 
clients’ 
social 
landscape 
More 
successful 
when used in 
conjunction 
with 
treatment 
and other 
support 
  ************
***** 
******* ****** **** **** *** ** ** 
What, in your 
experience, have 
been the reasons 
clients have not 
taken up the 
opportunity to self-
exclude? 
Able to gamble 
elsewhere 
Not ready to 
stop 
gambling 
Shame  Lack of 
trust in the 
system 
Inconvenience, 
cost or effort of 
self-exclusion 
      
****** ***** **** *** ***     
What, in your 
experience, have 
been the reasons 
why clients have 
continued or 
returned to 
gambling during the 
time a self-exclusion 
agreement has been 
in force? 
Not ready to 
quit 
Can gamble 
elsewhere 
Agreements 
not rigorously 
enforced or 
policed 
To test the 
system 
Pressure of 
advertising 
No 
additional 
support in 
place 
Peer 
pressure/ 
no  
alternative 
activities in 
place 
Responsibility 
for enforcement 
unclear 
****** **** *** *** *** *** ** ** 
If, in your 
knowledge, family 
or friends of the 
gambler have been 
assisted or 
supported by 
him/her being 
subject to a self-
exclusion agreement 
please list their 
comments in this 
box.  
There should 
be more 
information on 
its availability 
It’s a 
positive 
step/shows 
commitment 
Needs to be 
better enforced 
Feel they 
are 
policing 
the 
gambler 
Allows them to 
trust the gambler 
again 
   
**** ** ** * *   
In your opinion, as 
a treatment 
provider, how could 
self-exclusion be 
improved to 
enhance player 
protection 
measures? 
Better 
enforcement 
(use 
technology, 
penalties for 
breach) 
Staff 
training 
should be 
improved 
Should be 
multi-operator 
More 
promotion 
and 
provision 
of info 
Should be 
immediate/ 
discreet 
No 
advertising 
should be 
allowed 
during 
exclusion 
period 
Should be 
linked to 
treatment 
(e.g., 
reinstated 
only on 
advice) 
Tailored 
exclusion 
should be 
allowed, 
rather than 
blanket bans 
********** ****** **** **** **** *** ** ** 
Notes: Some treatment providers made more than one point and some made no points or did not have 
sufficient explanation to warrant inclusion; categories are not mutually exclusive but arranged in the most 
descriptive and useful way to represent subtle differences in responses. 
 
There was limited consensus between operators regarding the following 
principles: 
• options should be provided to customers to exclude by different 
product; 
• exactly how information from third parties might be used in the self-
exclusion process; 
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• appropriate duration of a ban and the substantive difference between 
cooling-off breaks and self-exclusion; 
• players being able to enact self-exclusion without interacting with 
staff or coming into the venue (so that there is mutual understanding 
between parties regarding player motivations and implications of the 
agreement); 
• whilst all operators agreed that self-exclusion should be accessible, 
there was less certainty regarding what ‘active promotion’ necessarily 
entailed. 
 
2.2 Treatment provider perspectives  
 
A range of treatment organisations were approached and invited to 
participate in a survey designed to improve understanding regarding treatment 
providers’ attitudes and views on clients’ experiences of self-exclusion.2 It 
should be noted that clients currently receiving support and/or treatment for 
their gambling will not necessarily be representative of all players who decide 
to self-exclude. A summary of the open-ended questions and responses 
grouped by theme and response frequency is presented in Table 2. 
 
3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND STAKEHOLDER 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
3.1 Operating self-exclusion 
 
3.1.1 Promoting self-exclusion 
 
Simplicity and convenience are key guiding principles underpinning 
successful self-exclusion (Gainsbury, 2013; Nowatzki & Williams, 2002; 
Responsible Gambling Council, 2008; Williams, West & Simpson, 2013). 
However, the active promotion of self-exclusion varies considerably across 
operators, sectors and jurisdictions.  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Low levels of uptake 
 
Although records of self-exclusion engagement are not systematically kept by all 
treatment providers, an example given indicates that only a small minority of those in 
treatment have engaged with self-exclusion prior to seeking help. 
 
“Anecdotally, the proportion of clients who approach the service for counselling 
who have self-excluded from betting shops or casinos before contact with us is in 
the region of 5-15%. This figure is based on assessment notes where it may have 
been mentioned by the client, either as a successful initial method or otherwise.” 
 
2 This survey was designed and administered by the Self-Exclusion Working Group 
and the National Clinicians Network Forum. 
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Simplicity is important 
 
The limited capabilities of a problem gambler was also identified as an important 
reason for having a simple and convenient registration process: 
 
“Only 40% of them actually wanted to go through the process of self-excluding as 
they have to go into each outlet they were trying to avoid and ban themselves from 
each filling in a form/including photos. Obviously to go into that environment 
without gambling is nigh on impossible due to the stimuli that would be in there for 
them. Not to mention spending what money they have on getting passport photos 
done. This process also requires forward planning and organisation; generally 
speaking when someone is in the midst of a gambling problem they can’t do 
either.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Staff contact or not? 
 
Most operators supported the notion that a player should be able to enact an 
agreement without having to interact with customer services staff: 
 
“…shame, guilt, fear etc are a common features among addicts or players who 
believe that they might develop an unhealthy attitude towards their gambling 
therefore giving them the option to self-exclude without interaction is advisable 
because forcing them to interact with customer services first might put an extra 
threshold they might not overcome.” 
 
“We believe it can be very difficult and shameful for players to admit that they 
have lost control over their gambling. We do not see any reasons, why the industry 
should aim to artificially make this threshold any higher than necessary. We 
believe the best way to file self-exclusion is a clear and unambiguous web interface 
that fully informs the player of all consequences his decision will have. After filing 
this form, the player should receive a written confirmation of his request that 
signposts relevant counselling offers. We however agree that the player should not 
be forced to use one specific medium. Self-exclusion requests should be accepted 
via all channels, which can assure the identity of the requestor.” 
 
However, some operators disagreed and suggested that staff-customer interactions 
are important in determining that exclusion is right for them, that the customer is 
who they say they are, and that they understand what they are committing to:  
 
“…the implications of the exclusion need to be clear, the documentation completed 
correctly and a photograph provided.  […] this can be done in shop or via 
telephone contact with our designated exclusion line. To do otherwise creates 
unmanageable situations for operators and, ultimately means that exclusions are 
not properly implemented.” 
 
“We would say ‘no’ otherwise the customer may not have the opportunity to fully 
discuss self-exclusion with a member of staff in order to understand what the 
agreement entails, whether or not it is right for them and what the implications are 
of entering into one. We do agree however, that a customer should be able to 
renew their annual self-exclusion agreement without the need to re-enter the 
betting premises (ie by calling a dedicated Customer Care number).” 
 
According to the literature, operator-based promotion of self-exclusion in 
various jurisdictions is considered to be comparatively weak. In one study in 
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Australia, for example, despite the mandatory promotion of self-exclusion 
programmes, only 10% of venues were identified as visibly promoting their 
programmes (Interchurch Gambling Taskforce, 2000). In a South Australian 
sample of self-excluders, it was reported that only 11% were prompted by 
staff, and of the 17% who had independently approached staff to request 
possible options for managing their problem, only half were given 
information about self-exclusion (Hing & Nuske, 2012). Similarly, in a 
German sample, only 39% reported any previous awareness of the option to 
self-exclude prior to seeking help on their own initiative (Hayer & Meyer, 
2011a). Rate of uptake of self-exclusion options among problem gamblers is 
considered to be very low. Estimates range between 0.4% and 3.5% of 
problem gamblers in land-based venues (Nowatzki & Williams, 2003; O’Neil 
et al., 2003; SACES, 2003).  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Active promotion is important 
 
Current promotion and levels of awareness were considered to be inadequate among 
some treatment organisations: 
 
“A more pro-active approach from gambling venues when recognising problematic 
gamblers, staff could approach these clients and talk to them about self-exclusion 
and other support available (more staff training may help to support this) My 
understanding is that this is supposed to happen now however very few of my clients 
have disclosed having experience of this.” 
 
“I think it is imperative to make everyone aware of the tools and strategies involved 
with self-exclusion and often family/friends will be very supportive of this step being 
taken but have often been skeptical on how it works and if it works.” 
 
Views here were generally critical of operator role in promoting and facilitating 
self-exclusion. 
 
“Clients express concern of ‘walking in there’, being tempted and losing control.” 
 
“Several clients reported being ‘talked out’ of self-exclusion by the bookie.” 
 
“The client who self-excluded from an adult gaming centre had quite a challenging 
experience. There were a number of barriers that had to be overcome, i.e., the 
establishment had no accessible literature. Self-exclusion was not promoted within 
the organisation i.e., posters displayed. We challenged two establishments 
requesting their policies and procedures on self-exclusion.” 
 
It was suggested that the following should be done: 
 
“Large notices on display to offer self-exclusion as a support to problematic 
gambling. More information could be made visible to clients in gambling venues 
about self-exclusion.” 
 
“Help for problem gambling should be offered to staff. Helpline numbers should 
be more visible.” 
 
“Making online self-exclusion options easier to find and choose.” 
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“Having easily identified links – on gambling sites – to sites where self-exclusion 
is explained.” 
 
“Periodic written reminders to individuals to confirm their self-exclusion 
timescales.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Requirement to define ‘active promotion’ 
 
Operators’ comments point to a need for a clearer definition of what is meant by 
‘active promotion’ of self-exclusion, specifying the difference between 
accessibility and promotion: 
 
“We believe self-exclusion should be available to all customers. Whether it should 
be ‘actively promoted’ is a question of definition.” 
 
“It should be clearly available and simple to access so people in need can utilise it 
without any difficulty.”  
 
“Not actively promoted but available in all venues and all staff aware of the self-
exclusion process.” 
 
3.1.2 Enacting self-exclusion and cooling-off 
 
While there was no coverage of this issue in the academic literature, 
responses from both surveys suggest that requests to self-exclude should take 
immediate effect.  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Requests should take immediate effect 
 
“Venues should not be able to offer 24 hours cooling off period – we all tend to 
change our mind after a night’s sleep – if a person has experienced problems with 
gambling that should be taken seriously immediately, before someone with a 
gambling problem goes back to chasing in the forlorn hope to win his losses back.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Requests should take immediate effect 
 
The majority of operators suggested that requests to enact a self-exclusion 
agreement should be implemented immediately: 
 
“In the case of self-exclusion we are dealing with a potential addict. We fail to see 
why we would artificially delay the acceptance of a self-exclusion request, knowing 
that the player has a very high risk of relapse. We believe self-exclusion should be 
implemented at the first possible point in time after the player's request. Delays 
should only be acceptable in case the request was ambiguous (e.g., player not 
mentioning whether the self-exclusion should be temporary or indefinite).” 
 
3.1.3 Barriers to uptake 
 
Nowatski and Williams (2002) suggest that in practice, the self-exclusion 
process requires an investment of time and potential embarrassment, both of 
which may act as disincentives to uptake. Disincentives are considered in 
more detail below. 
64 
RESTRICTING ACCESS TO GAMBLING 
 
 
The general requirement for self-exclusion to be simple and convenient is 
arguably most relevant to the implementation process once the gambler has 
made the decision to take action. A variety of options for activation, such as 
via the internet, by telephone or in person, should be made available 
(Productivity Commission, 2010). Technology may drive evolution in this 
regard, drawing on other media promoting convenience such as mobile 
phones and apps. In addition to variety in channels, consideration might also 
be given to extending activation points beyond operations to potentially 
including relevant third parties such as treatment providers or the regulator 
(Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). 
Requirements to enact a self-exclusion agreement in person (or through 
phoning customer services in the case of remote gambling) may cause 
embarrassment, thereby acting as a disincentive (Productivity Commission, 
2010). This may be due to the potential stigma of help-seeking behaviour. 
Individuals suffering more generally from psychological or psychiatric 
distress, even if severe, often do not seek help (Bebbington, Meltzer, Brugha, 
Farrell, Jenkins, Ceresa, & Lewis, 2000). Specifically, only around 10 to 15% 
of problem gamblers ever seek help (Cunningham, 2005; Slutske, 2006; 
Volberg, Nysse-Carris, & Gerstein, 2006; Productivity Commission, 1999; 
Ministry of Health, 2007; Suurvali, Hodgins, Toneatto, & Cunningham, 
2008).  
Finally, if a gambler has taken steps to stop gambling, and has 
demonstrated impaired control in the gambling environment, then it may be 
counter-productive to require them to visit the gambling venue. Hing and 
Nuske (2012) found that self-excluding in the gambling venue put the 
individual in a position of necessary further exposure to gambling. This may 
also apply to remote gambling where the gambler is required to visit the 
website to enact. 
 
3.1.4 Reinstatement 
 
Reinstatement, i.e. re-entering into a self-exclusion agreement at the end 
of its original term, should be made possible from various points of access, 
thus removing the need to visit the venue and face potential temptation to 
gamble (Hing & Nuske, 2012; Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). It has 
also been recommended that the restrictions should only be lifted after some 
form of ‘positive action’ (i.e., a request to return to the casino) rather than 
permitting access automatically at the end of the exclusion period 
(Responsible Gambling Council, 2008).  
Treatment Providers Survey – Positive action 
 
The need for such positive action was consistent with some views from treatment 
providers:  
 
“In Australia a person has to apply in writing to a venue to be allowed back after 
the self-exclusion period has expired.  Canberra Casino would insist that a 
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gambling counsellor would write a recommendation that it would be okay to do so, 
since they were concerned that responsible gambling could be sustainable.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Access should not be automatic 
 
The most common response by operators was that there should be some form of 
engagement prior to reinstating a customer and terminating an exclusion 
agreement: 
 
“Our approach is that there should be some engagement.   We do not believe an 
automatic reinstatement (i.e., without even asking) is appropriate, although we do 
not feel it necessarily requires a full discussion if it is the first such request and 
there are no mitigating factors.  However, for any contentious request (e.g., 
something of concern written on the request form) and/or a second or third 
request, we would always want and expect a conversation and would make a 
decision based on what we believe is best (which can and does sometimes result in 
a refusal).” 
 
Some operators suggested that reinstatement should be accompanied by additional 
controls or restrictions: 
 
“In our opinion any account that is reinstated should be fitted with a loss limit. 
Therefore the account should not be reinstated automatically. Before being 
reinstated the player needs to ask for it in writing (email) and should then get an 
email highlighting the info available on responsible gaming and asking them to 
make a suggestion for a daily, weekly or monthly loss limit (or all at the same 
time). The responsible gaming department has to assess the account prior to 
receiving an answer from the customer and has to have a clear number of max loss 
at hand before the customer comes back with his or her answer. If the customer 
comes back with a higher figure then the responsible gaming department cannot 
set the limit higher as previously determined internally (or leave the account 
closed as the case may be). If limit suggested by customer is lower than what has 
been determined internally then usually the customer gets the limit he asked for (in 
any case never higher than suggested by the customer).”  
 
“What I would suggest would be that the account is automatically reopened after 
the termination of the self-exclusion period, but no marketing material should be 
sent to the customer stating that the exclusion is over.  The customer still has to log 
in in order to play. Then it is up to the customer to choose whether or not the 
customer should play on the account.  If the operator engages with the customer 
after the self-exclusion period has passed, this may result in enticing a player who 
might not want to play.” 
 
3.1.5 Detection and enforcement of self-exclusion 
 
In research exploring casino-based self-exclusions in other jurisdictions, 
evidence suggests that at least 50% continue to gamble either with the same 
provider or elsewhere (DeBruin, 2001; Ladouceur, Jacques, Giroux, Ferland, 
& Leblond, 2000; Ly, 2010; Nelson et al., 2010) and that 33–77% of breaches 
go undetected by staff (Croucher et al., 2006; Schellinck & Schrans, 2004). 
Nelson and colleagues (2010), in their Missouri casino-based study, followed 
up with 113 self-excluders reporting that only 25% ceased gambling 
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completely. Of that sample, 16% had reported breaching their agreement with 
the originating casino. 
Evidence also suggests that the probability of a breach increases 
considerably over the duration of an individual’s agreement (Ladouceur, 
Sylvain, & Gosselin, 2007; Ly 2010). In Tasmania, for example, only one 
person from a sample of 40 self-excluders reported gambling during the first 
three months, however over half of the sample eventually did breach before 
the end of their agreement (Ly, 2010).   
 
3.1.6 Disincentives for breaching self-exclusion 
 
Ly (2010, p.57) identified that a key disincentive to breaching self-
exclusion agreements was embarrassment, with patrons suggesting that they 
“just couldn’t go”.  However, the impact of potentially being embarrassed 
may be moderated by perceived responsibility for maintaining that agreement 
(with embarrassment potentially being lower where they reject responsibility). 
Even where consumers are made aware of their rights and responsibilities 
under a self-exclusion agreement, many still believe it is the responsibility of 
the operator to ban them from accessing and participating in gambling 
activities (Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). 
 
Treatment Professionals Survey – Client disincentives for breaches 
 
“… the sense of shame they state they would feel if they were refused entry to a 
venue that they have excluded themselves from are often intrinsic as to how effective 
the self-exclusion will be for a client.” 
 
One treatment provider provided a list of reasons for clients attempting to breach: 
 
“Underlying personal difficulties which keep re-emerging; Using gambling as a 
coping strategy; Strong attachment to gambling due to past use; Gambling is easily 
accessible on high street and online; Exposure to advertisements; Unable to replace 
gambling with other activities.” 
 
Penalising the self-excluder may act as a disincentive to breaching their 
agreement. However, financial penalties may be unworkable, as this would 
suggest that the problem gambler has control over their gambling, which not 
usually the case (Napolitano, 2003; Faregh & Leth-Steenson, 2009). Nowatzki 
and Williams (2002) warn against the use of a financial penalty given the 
deleterious impact it would be likely to have on a problem gambler’s 
economic situation.  
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Customer penalties inappropriate 
 
Operators were not supportive of penalising the customer as a disincentive. 
 
“…gambling addiction is a disease with an ‘unreasonable’ urge to gamble, penalties 
would not deter and would not serve anything in our opinion.” 
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The most common response was that penalising customers would not be feasible and 
would be too difficult to manage: 
 
“To be able to enforce, self-exclusion could no longer be a ‘voluntary’ agreement 
with the added emphasis being on the customer to comply. It is difficult to see how 
penalties would benefit either party and would be impractical to manage – especially 
with the legal consequences of each case.” 
 
While imposing financial penalties may not be feasible, an alternative 
disincentive may be to withhold any winnings where gamblers are in breach 
of their self-exclusion agreement.  This is done in various US states (Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, Michigan and New Jersey; Ladell & Smith, 2011). The primary 
disincentive for the problem gambler in this instance is to remove the 
motivation to chase losses. While evidence suggests that the long-term 
motivation of problem gamblers is not financial (Binde, 2013; Stewart & 
Zack, 2008), the opportunity to gamble and win money is still a critical 
component of impaired control, given its relationship to excessive loss-
chasing behaviour. The British Columbia Lottery Corporation found some 
support for this claim from stakeholder interviews following their 
implementation of a disentitlement policy (Ladell & Smith, 2011) in addition 
to suggestions that reduced excitement may also deter breaches.  
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Withholding winnings as a disincentive 
 
Some operators suggested that disentitlement may be the most appropriate 
disincentive: 
 
“As all bets are voided and all funds returned the penalty for the player is they cannot 
receive winnings on accounts opened after an exclusion…” 
 
“What penalties are envisaged?  The customer, if found on the premises, certainly 
should not be able to retain any of his winnings.” 
 
Some operators outline that these issues are not straightforward even if the aim is 
laudable.  
 
“We feel this [penalties] is difficult. By means of self-exclusion, the customer states 
that he might be experiencing relevant gambling-related problems, potentially 
ranging up to a mental disorder. We are unsure whether such a player would be 
responsible for his behaviour, when trying to circumvent a self-exclusion. However, 
we agree that trying to circumvent self-exclusion provisions should be 
disincentivised.” 
 
“There are an increasing number of cases where people try to claim back losses on 
the pretence of having a gambling problem (and, of course, sometimes when they 
legitimately do) and the issue of liability for a SE breach is a difficult one.  As an 
industry, we do not believe that operators should be liable for repayment if a SE 
customer does not keep their side of the agreement by staying away.   We would not 
expect them to return winnings accrued during a breach.   The threat of imposing 
‘penalties’ depends on what is intended, but the idea of threatening prosecution for 
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trespass has been used and is not a bad idea if it helps keep them away and protect 
against claims if they do get in.   Even then, whether such penalties could realistically 
be enforced in practice is another matter, but they can serve as a deterrent.” 
 
One option would be to void all potential winnings by self-excluders who 
had gained access to gambling opportunities. 
It has been suggested that the operator may allocate forfeited winnings to 
support research, treatment and education in problem gambling, which would 
ensure there is no misunderstanding regarding the aims and objectives of the 
initiative (Productivity Commission, 2010).  
However, the extent to which this approach would be legally enforceable 
is questionable. Napolitano (2003) suggests that, in some jurisdictions where 
such arrangements are in place, these ultimately have not proved legally 
permissible. However, the legal framework may have shifted over the last 
decade. 
In some jurisdictions (e.g., Tasmania, Ly, 2010) breaches incur fines for 
the operator, a practice that has been advocated by some experts (Nowatzki & 
Williams, 2002) to incentivise improved enforcement efforts among 
operators. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, 
computerised ID checks are required for casino entry and the level of recorded 
breaches is significantly reduced if not eradicated as result (Nowatski & 
Williams, 2002).  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Operator penalties could improve commitment 
 
There was some support for operator penalties among clinicians, with some stating 
that enforcement would be more effective: 
 
[in response to a question on potential improvements] “If a penalty was introduced to 
gambling establishments who do not effectively uphold the self-exclusion agreement 
by allowing self-excluded clients to continue gambling in their establishments.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Operator penalties for wilful disregard of 
agreements 
 
Some operators suggest that this might be appropriate for wilful disregard of self-
exclusion agreements: 
 
“Depends on the nature of the breach” 
 
“Depending on the breach of the self-exclusion, penalties should be imposed if the 
operator removed a person's self-exclusion despite the agreement being a certain time 
frame.”  
“In the case of negligence or knowingly breaching, then yes: breach would need to be 
defined carefully.” 
 
“Penalties should apply, but only in the case of negligence by the operator. More 
relevant however, all losses of a self-excluder who managed to gain access to 
gambling opportunities should be voided.” 
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Other operators point out that penalties, although not necessarily automatic nor 
systematic, may already be applied by the regulator: 
 
“SE must be a two way agreement with both sides making best efforts to meet their 
side of the arrangement.    An operator should be expected to make best efforts and 
are required by the LCCP to do so.   Any potential for ‘penalties’ is therefore down to 
the Commission in terms of whether the operator is realistically meeting its 
obligations.  However, that would be for wholesale breaches.  For the odd individual 
breach, the operator should not be liable provided they take action to address any 
weakness in their systems that might have contributed.” 
 
3.1.7 Improving detection 
 
Ly (2010) makes the following suggestions for the improvement of 
detection accuracy in self-exclusion: 
 
• requiring self-excluders to provide both a profile and a camera-facing 
photograph for each agreement and requiring staff to spend time 
looking at the photos at the start of every shift; 
• electronic (such as a driver’s licence or player card) rather than paper-
based systems could enable operators to effectively check patrons 
against a database of self-excluders;  
• an electronic identification system may also have the added benefit of 
enabling venues to detect minors, identify other unwelcome patrons, 
and to assist player tracking and data management.  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Detection and enforcement need improvement 
 
There was a general sense among clinicians that enforcement was poor in most 
locations. 
 
Some concerns were expressed that some gambling industry staff wilfully 
disregarded self-exclusion agreements:  
 
“A client reported that he had self-excluded and went in anyway, which prompted 
the person at the counter to reinstate him (since my client ‘obviously wanted to 
gamble again’).” 
 
An area that was identified as being weak on enforcement was retail outlets selling 
lottery tickets and scratch cards:  
 
“The most difficult area to self-exclude from was issues around lotteries and 
scratch cards due to the volume of opportunity to gamble on these and the lack of 
recognition that such activities could cause, particularly by shop owners and small 
retailers.”  
 
“It is very difficult to effectively self-exclude from lottery retail outlets due to the 
sheer volume of different premises offering this provision.” 
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Self-exclusion was reported as most effective when the gambler attended one 
venue in particular: 
 
“Clients find self-exclusion most effective, when they gamble alone or in a specific 
gambling place; such as a betting shop.”  
 
“Clients who find self-exclusion more successful are generally those that use only 
one or two betting shops habitually.” 
 
“Self-exclusion in betting shops seems to work if it is the client’s regular betting 
shop but excluding from all in one company in a given area seems to be less 
effective according to feedback.” 
 
The use of technology was raised as a potentially important strategy for improving 
enforcing and detection: 
 
“Gambling establishments should have digital photos that should be circulated 
throughout all branches.” 
 
“Modern technology to be used nationwide to make the process more effective and 
easier to deploy.” 
 
“Introduce mandatory electronic membership cards to enable gambling, which 
would be disabled or taken away from self-excluded gamblers.” 
 
3.2 Impact of self-exclusion 
 
There currently exists a void of robust evaluation studies which can offer 
any meaningful insight into the impact of self-exclusion in minimising 
gambling-related harm (Gainsbury, 2013; Nowatzki & Williams, 2002; 
Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). Evaluation of impact should explore 
‘effectiveness’ (impact on gambling-related harm) and ‘efficiency’ (required 
resources being used optimally to minimise harm) rather than just promotion 
and take-up as the only indicators of success. 
In terms of effectiveness, numerous studies across a variety of 
jurisdictions have reported reductions in problem gambling (Hayer & Meyer, 
2011a; Ladouceur & colleagues, 2000, 2007; Nelson et al., 2010; Tremblay et 
al., 2008). There has also been support that such positive impacts are 
enduring, with impact still noted at follow-up periods up to ten years later 
(Nelson et al., 2010; Hayer & Meyer, 2011a). Improvements in well-being 
(Hayer & Meyer, 2011a; Ladouceur et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 2010), control 
over gambling (Ladouceur et al., 2007), and social and familial functioning 
(Ladouceur et al., 2007; Tremblay et al., 2008) have also been reported. No 
studies to date have examined efficiency in provision. 
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Assistance for significant others 
 
Some clinicians identified that the self-exclusion process provided additional support for 
those significant others in the gambler’s social support network: 
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“Most of the partners felt that it was a positive step and showed their partner was willing 
to do something to correct their behaviours.”  
 
“Where family support is available, feedback has suggested that family members feel the 
gambler has made a higher level of commitment to change.” 
 
“This enables the family/friends to begin to trust in the gambler again.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Evaluation not an easy task 
 
Some operators make the point that evaluating impact is not straightforward: 
 
 “In-house we evaluate how well we monitor and spot related accounts but how does 
the industry measure whether self-exclusion is helping people with gambling issues 
or just utilised as a method of account closure and the people with gambling issues 
just close their accounts in the normal way.” 
 
“We agree [that evaluation should be done] — although it is difficult to necessarily 
assess how effective they have been.  We assess and compare the number of 
exclusions each year, but remain unclear whether more is good or bad as there are 
various mitigating factors. For example, is more a result of an increase in problem 
gamblers or better awareness through information being provided?  How do we 
know whether someone who excluded has benefited if we don't see them again?  Has 
it helped their problem or have they simply gone to gamble elsewhere?  It is difficult 
for operators to contact SE customers and ask ‘how is it going?’ as this could be 
misconstrued or have the wrong effect.” 
 
“By what measures is an operator supposed to evaluate the effectiveness of a self-
exclusion programme?  If the person never comes back? If he comes back after his 
self-exclusion and is a model customer? “  
 
3.3 Who self-excludes? 
 
Research examining land-based self-exclusion suggests that there is a 
particular demographic profile for the typical land-based self-excluder. Self-
excluders are predominantly male, middle-aged, married or cohabiting, and 
the vast majority are problem gamblers (De Bruin et al., 2001; Haefeli, 2002; 
Ladouceur et al., 2000; Ladouceur et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 2010; Steinberg 
& Velardo, 2002). Gender differences are also reported, with female self-
excluders more likely to be older, be divorced, separated or widowed, have 
shorter gambling careers and to prefer games determined by chance (Nower & 
Blaszczynski, 2006). In remote gambling settings, the profile tends to vary 
somewhat, with excluders being more likely to be single (Hayer & Mayer, 
2011) and younger (Dragcevic et al., 2013; Hayer & Mayer, 2011; Wardle, 
2012). 
While the earlier empirical evidence offers some support for the claim that 
it is predominantly problem gamblers who request exclusion agreements 
(Ladouceur et al., 2000; Steinberg & Verlado, 2002; Blaszczynski & Nower, 
2004), more recent European studies focussing on samples from remote 
operations have shown that self-exclusion agreements are used by players 
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from across the full spectrum of gambling participation (Griffiths et al., 2009; 
Hayer & Meyer, 2011; Wardle, 2012) with as few as 10% of excluders in one 
study doing so to manage gambling-related harm (Griffiths et al., 2009). 
Griffiths et al. also reported that less than 1% of their remote gambling sample 
used self-exclusion to attempt a permanent cessation of gambling. However, it 
is unclear whether these differences in motivation reflect changes over time, 
differences across jurisdiction, differences between remote and land-based 
operations or a combination of these factors. 
In a series of innovative studies using player data captured from a remote 
gambling operator, Shaffer and colleagues identified a series of behavioural 
markers indicative of whether a gambler eventually self-excludes, including 
higher staking levels, higher levels of net expenditure, greater variability in 
betting and greater frequency of play (Braverman & Shaffer, 2012; LaBrie & 
Shaffer, 2011; Xuan & Shaffer, 2009). In another study, also drawing on 
behavioural data, this time from a different remote operator, Dragcevic et al. 
(2013) reported that self-excluders were more likely to have a higher net 
expenditure and to play casino games.  
 
3.4 Multi-Operator Self-Exclusion Schemes (MOSES) 
 
A fundamental criticism of existing self-exclusion arrangements, in 
relation to both land-based and remote gambling, is the relative ease with 
which most consumers can continue to gamble at other venues, sites, 
operators, sectors or jurisdictions. This situation not only undermines the 
potential impact of self-exclusion to problem gamblers but also penalises 
more responsible operators. Consequently, there exists an imperative to 
explore and develop a ‘collective’ option where data and resources can be 
shared, so that gamblers can have the choice of a more comprehensive reach 
when they take the decision to self-exclude.  
An important consideration, particularly in the context of land-based 
operations, is that outcomes should justify the resources that would be 
required to support them. For example, it may not be a prudent use of 
resources to develop a system permitting a consumer enacting a self-exclusion 
agreement in the south of England, to expect an exclusion request to be 
successfully enforced in a venue of the same operator in the north of Scotland. 
The likelihood of such a system being necessary to minimise harm would be 
extremely low, and the resources required to support it would be extremely 
high. This focus on efficiency is not about protecting industry profits, but 
about ensuring that resources dedicated to harm minimisation are used in an 
optimal way.  
Regarding options in the remote sector, technological developments can 
drive self-exclusion to evolve through the creation and maintenance of an 
anonymous and secure ‘register’ (Dragicevic, 2011; Francis, Dragicevic & 
Parke, 2012). Such technology could give gamblers the option to restrict 
access beyond the original site to other operators participating in the scheme.    
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Treatment Providers Survey – Multi-operator self-exclusion is important 
 
The need for multi-operator self-exclusion schemes was endorsed. Allowing the 
customer to choose between all or only a selection of venues and sites was considered 
to be important. 
 
“The one comment that occurs on a regular basis is the need for global self-exclusion 
or a national database that works with all online companies, to stop clients going 
from one to another with ease.” 
 
There were also some examples of where this was being tried and developed: 
 
“There is an organisation already in existence called ‘count me out’ 
www.countmeout.org.uk, they have a service that allows a person to self-exclude 
without having to enter a gambling establishment to do it and a database set up 
covering several areas. It has 126 industry members showing on the website who are 
connected to it at the moment. Currently it is utilised mainly with casinos/ arcades 
etc., however if the main companies also signed up this could be useful.”  
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Multi-operator self-exclusion is important but 
presents challenges 
 
The vast majority of responses identify that this is an important but challenging 
objective. 
 
An interesting point regarding resources was made, in that focussing on a specific 
region across all operators will be more effective than focussing on all regions across 
just one operator. 
 
“We agree and are working on this with other land-based operators.   There is an 
argument that a total exclusion across a local area (all types of gambling) is more 
valid than across multiple operators of the same product, but who may not be 
represented in the same town.  However, anything that allows a customer to easily 
extend their request (without having to make it multiple times) is desirable. Online is 
more difficult, due to the vast number of sites, but the UK point of consumption 
licensing might bring this closer to reality.  Again, as long as the customer has the 
choice it makes sense.   They must have that choice in order to overcome the data 
protection issues of otherwise sharing their information with other sites without their 
consent.” 
 
“A national database that operators can access would be a great introduction. 
Locality needs looking into, automatic boundaries inside which exclusion from all 
operators take place.” 
 
Only one of the 26 participating operators suggested that each operator should be 
responsible for managing their own player exclusions. 
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Table 3: Challenges and Potential Solutions for Implementing Collective Self-
Exclusion in the Remote Gambling Sector (S. Dragicevic, personal communication, 
September 18, 2011; Francis et al., 2012) 
Industry 
Concerns 
Response 
Technical 
integration 
*A small number of data fields are required to share amongst operators which are 
available from every operator making operator integration very simple 
*In addition operators can manually upload CSV files to the system, which means that 
operators can start sharing relevant data without any technology integration 
System 
development 
and 
maintenance 
cost 
*In the case of VeriPlay3 established cloud technologies are used, it is quickly and easily 
scaled to on-board additional operators.  The cost of storage, central processing units and 
network bandwidth has exponentially decreased since the 1980s e.g., the cost per terabyte 
of storage from Apple in 1980 was $14 million, today it is $70 (Barracuda). Therefore this 
is not an issue 
*Additional industry and regulatory requirements can also be quickly and cost effectively 
added to the system to ensure it can evolve at the pace that industry innovation changes to 
meet operator requirements e.g., supporting self-exclusion across different gaming 
verticals 
*Arguably more expensive self-exclusion systems (e.g. facial recognition technology) 
have already been adopted in some global jurisdictions e.g., Canada. 
Data privacy *Secure encryption algorithms ensures data always remains anonymous except for the 
operators sending and receiving the data i.e., ensuring a player’s anonymity by separating 
a player’s identity from the player’s account data.  This can be achieved through a number 
of proven statistical and mathematical methods, including data reduction, data 
perturbation and data hashing methods 
*Therefore data stored in this encrypted format is meaningless to the operator of the self-
exclusion service (VeriPlay) and is arguably more secure than when stored in the 
gambling operator’s own data centre 
*There is a precedent for sharing data as operators today share anonymised player data for 
non-commercial reasons e.g., European Sports Security Association (ESSA) to ensure 
integrity in online sports betting, bwin and Harvard Medical School’s collaboration into 
problem gambling research 
Conflicting 
national laws 
*Not a valid reason, as it makes sense to adopt schemes at a national level as it is likely 
one would need to be a citizen of a regulated jurisdiction to gamble, which is what many 
jurisdictions are now actively implementing e.g., the Danish regulator is taking a step 
towards such a scheme with ROFUS (problem gambling register) 
Service abuse *Independent audits could enforce the integrity of a scheme. However, it is highly 
unlikely that established and regulated operators would risk their reputations by abusing 
such a scheme. If required, penalties could also be defined by the industry and/or 
regulators to ensure service abuse does not exist 
Driving 
customers to 
unregulated 
operators 
*Ensuring customers gamble with responsible, regulated operators is a broader regulatory 
issue that the EU and the industry need to work together to tackle and is not an excuse for 
not implementing such a service which could go a long way in protecting vulnerable 
gamblers 
Independent 
service 
management 
*The service could be governed collaboratively with relevant industry organizations or 
could be technically managed on behalf of a regulator or problem gambling treatment 
provider. The service could also easily be hosted on a regulator or other server if required 
 
 
 
3 Veriplay is a proprietary self-exclusion solution – see www.veriplay.org  
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3.4.1 Operational challenges 
 
Table 3 summarises the potential challenges that have been identified by 
the industry, and responses/resolutions to these challenges (S. Dragicevic, 
personal communication, September 18, 2011; Francis et al., 2012). Concerns 
include prohibitive costs, concerns over data privacy, integration challenges 
with various IT infrastructures, the potential for service abuse, driving 
customers to unregulated markets, and the need for independent service 
management. Dragicevic and colleagues believe some of the challenges can 
be overcome through effective policy and process design and through the use 
of secure technologies that are currently used to protect player data in 
regulated markets.  
 
3.4.2 Delivery and governance options 
 
Francis et al. (2012) assessed the potential options for the delivery and 
governance of a collective self-exclusion solution and categorised these into 
four categories of system: a ‘regulator-driven system’ whereby operators 
would be mandated to generate, manage and use a collective list (e.g., Danish 
regulatory approach); an ‘operator-driven system’ overseen by an industry 
collaboration in the absence of mandatory regulatory requirements; a ‘player-
driven system’ where players voluntarily add their names to the list and 
gambling operators can engage on their own terms (e.g., Aristotle and 
PlayerVerify); and a final option involving ‘computer blocking software’ 
which is purchased, downloaded and blocks access to gambling sites (e.g., 
Gamblock).  
Francis et al. carried out a subjective assessment of the potential 
effectiveness of approaches according to two dimensions they developed, 
including ‘Functional Scope Potential’ and ‘Player Adoption Potential’. This 
assessment is summarised in Table 4. Francis et al. concluded that the 
preferred governance solution would either be regulator-led with significant 
industry involvement, or operator-led with regulator endorsement. The player-
driven and software blocking approaches were considered inferior due to 
significant limitations as identified in the table. However, if ‘simplicity’ and 
‘barriers to implementation’ were considered as part of the assessment, then a 
player-driven system may also carry weight, particularly if it initiates a 
process which eventually leads to a more robust approach in due course. 
 
3.5 Optimal duration of agreement 
 
Duration of exclusion agreements varies considerably from a matter of 
hours in some remote operations (Griffiths, Wood, & Parke, 2009) to lifetime 
bans in some US states (e.g., Missouri; Nower & Blaszczynski, 2008). 
However, there is currently no academic consensus on the optimum length of 
exclusion for promoting harm minimisation and well-being. Nowatzki and 
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Williams (2002) advocate an irrevocable five-year contract and there is 
evidence that longer terms are preferred by gamblers (Ly, 2010; Steinberg & 
Velardo, 2002). There has also been evidence that longer bans result in lower 
and more stable visiting frequencies following the ban (De Bruin et al., 2001). 
 
Table 4: Governance Options for Collective Self-Exclusion  (Francis et al., 2012) 
  Scoring Criteria 
Regulator-
Driven 
System 
Operator-
Driven 
System 
Player-
Driven 
System 
Computer 
Blocking  
Fu
nc
tio
na
l S
co
pe
 P
ot
en
tia
l 
Multi- Channel Support Can the approach 
support multi-operator self-exclusion across 
multiple gaming channels e.g., retail, internet, 
mobile, etc? 
5 5 5 2 
Integrate Future Requirements Is the 
approach flexible and extendable to integrate 
future industry developments and functional 
requirements e.g., managing self-exclusion by 
gaming vertical across operators? 
4 6 3 2 
Multiple-Access Points Can the approach 
support multiple integration approaches, such 
as access to a central list via a technology 
integration (e.g., web API), human access to a 
list via a portal, etc? 
6 6 6 1 
Supports Problem Gambling Research Does 
the approach lend itself to support future 
academic research into problem gambling, for 
example via access to anonymised player data 
on problem gamblers on a central list? 
6 5 2 2 
Total 21 22 16 7 
A
do
pt
io
n 
Po
te
nt
ia
l 
Mandatory Operator Adoption Can the 
approach achieve mandatory adoption from 
gambling operators in a jurisdiction? 
6 4 2 1 
Low Marketing Effort Does the approach 
require minimal marketing effort to raise 
sufficient awareness amongst all consumers? 
6 3 1 2 
Low Cost to Player Does the approach require 
minimal time and cost to consumer to use? 6 6 3 1 
Low Cost to Operator Does the approach 
require the minimal operator investment in 
developing and/or integrating to the solution 
or service? 
3 2 4 5 
Total 21 15 10 9 
Notes: scored 0-6 with 6 being positive 
     
Gambling Operators Survey – Preference for six-month minimum length 
 
The most common response was that a six-month minimum term was currently 
employed (not necessarily that it was most appropriate) and this probably reflects 
licensing conditions. 
 
Some operators suggested that shorter more flexible arrangements were not in the best 
interest of the player: 
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“I don’t agree with this [flexible options for shorter ban length], the player has a 
‘gambling problem’ and there should be some period of time within which it is 
feasible that behaviour can change, if it is controlled by the player they could request 
a week and what difference in reality can a week make to a behavioural problem such 
as compulsive gambling.” 
 
It was suggested, depending on the sector and whether remote or land-based, this may 
not be the best use of resources for harm minimisation: 
 
“LBO-wise, it is far too difficult for staff to manage multiple ending agreements 
where there is no membership entry system. Across all other brands it would be 
abused too, purely as customers would not associate the seriousness of entering into a 
self-exclusion agreement with say a period of 48 hours. It would be utilised more as a 
method of ‘taking a break’ as opposed to a long term commitment to control gambling 
spend, for which it was originally intended.” 
 
Conversely, some suggest that retaining flexibility through using shorter 
bans with the option to review or terminate may be most effective 
(Blaszczynski & Nower, 2004; Griffiths, et al., 2009; Productivity 
Commission, 2010) and that short-term options should be available as long-
term or permanent bans may deter uptake (Productivity Commission, 2010). 
In the sample of internet gamblers, Griffiths et al. (2009) found 10% used the 
self-exclusion facility to take a ‘temporary’ break for a period of time. The 
most preferred exclusion term identified was a week-long term, endorsed by 
46% of the sample.  
Flexibility in duration of agreement may promote self-control for those 
preferring not to abstain, and may also increase uptake and the range of 
gamblers willing to consider it as an option for staying in control. Although 
self-exclusion has traditionally been considered one of the final options for 
consumers failing to regulate their gambling behaviour (Williams et al., 
2012), with increasing evidence that problem gambling is not necessarily a 
chronic condition (Delfabbro, 2013; Reith & Dobbie, 2012) the impact of 
shorter, more flexible exclusion arrangements merits further research. 
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Longer duration is preferable 
 
The general feeling was that there should be a longer minimum ban length than 6-12 
months:  
 
“Minimum exclusion period in Australia tends to be 12 months; I don’t think that six 
months are long enough.” 
 
“Venues only appear to offer the minimum six-month period rather than inform about 
options.” 
 
3.6 Links to treatment 
 
In some jurisdictions, self-exclusion agreements are linked with treatment, 
either by referring self-excluders to sources of help, by mandating attendance 
at treatment sessions prior to reinstatement, or by offering ongoing treatment 
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and support as an integral part of the self-exclusion agreement (Ladouceur et 
al., 2000, 2007; Nowatzki & Williams, 2002). There is mixed support for 
whether operators should play a more active role. While there is some support 
that self-excluders would value signposting (O’Neil, 2003; Responsible 
Gambling Council, 2008), other evidence suggests that taking the step to 
exclude was sufficient for managing their gambling (Ladouceur et al., 2007). 
Further, Ladouceur et al. found that the majority of self-excluders were 
unreceptive to the notion of therapeutic support, with 49% considering it but 
only 10% eventually accessing it.  
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Treatment is the best solution 
 
“I think it would be very difficult if not impossible to implement a self-exclusion 
system which would be effective in the way we/society want it to be. This, in my view, 
is because of the nature of the human mind when it is in a state of ambivalence. Our 
actions can suggest we desire to stop doing something when our psychological desire 
is still to do it. We are often not ready to change things as change can mean loss and 
anxiety. Further, taking preventative measures may simply be a means of appeasing 
others.  However, there is still a measure of protection or minimisation of harm that 
self-exclusion offers and the use of it may contain an already unwieldy problem for 
the client.  In that respect, offering self-exclusion that is linked somehow to getting 
real help/treatment would be a better way to administer it.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – ‘Inform’ rather than ‘refer’ regarding treatment 
 
The overwhelming majority of operators reported that while they do not make direct 
referral for various reasons (data protection, lack of clinical expertise), they do 
provide sign-posting information regarding various relevant resources: 
“We have information on where customers can obtain help but it is not appropriate 
for staff who are not medically or psychiatrically trained to be making referrals.  It is 
also impractical in a 24-hour gaming business as this would require a team of 
appropriately trained people to be employed round the clock for the occasional 
person who requires such assistance.  The cost would massively outweigh the 
advantages.” 
 
“This is not done within our organisation unless we have agreement with the person 
who self-excluded, due to the Data Protection Act. We do however provide customers 
who request exclusion due to gambling problems and/or addiction, local information 
of where help can be obtained.” 
 
Beyond the notion of sign-posting, it is not clear whether operator-based 
self-exclusion should carry with it the requirement to seek some form of 
treatment. Most forms of talking therapies have been shown only to benefit 
those who are receptive and motivated (Arean & Miranda, 1996; Cooper et 
al., 2003). For this reason, mandatory counselling is not likely to be effective, 
and may actually act as a deterrent to entering into a self-exclusion 
arrangement (Nowatzki & Williams, 2002; Ladouceur et al., 2007; 
Responsible Gambling Council, 2008). Ly (2010) suggested that an 
alternative option may be to nominate a sponsor known to the individual to 
provide social support during the process, which could work better than a 
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helpline providing support from strangers. Ly suggests that this may also help 
with potential boredom and social support during exclusion. 
 
3.7 Third-party exclusion requests 
 
Some operations in some jurisdictions have explored ‘third-party’ 
exclusions whereby a significant other can request an exclusion be enacted to 
protect the welfare of the problem gambler (Thompson, 2001).  However, this 
approach would require that the significant other can correctly identify that 
such an intervention is needed, which is a questionable assumption. It has 
been shown that, while often motivated by an intrinsic desire to solve their 
gambling problems, 23% of self-excluders are persuaded by others to 
negotiate a self-exclusion agreement (Nelson et al., 2010). Also, such an 
approach opens up the possibility of abuse and would be likely to invoke a 
significant administrative burden. Nowatski and Williams (2002) concluded 
in their review that this approach has been employed with only limited 
success. 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Consideration rather than automatic action 
 
Operators generally identify that this approach is fraught with issues and may not be 
reliable for reasons already captured above. Some operators suggest that this 
information may still be used even if it does directly trigger the exclusion: 
 
“It has to be done in a manner not to go against the Data Protection Act.  If a third 
party contacts the company because they are worried that a person is playing too 
much or having a problem, the customer service agent will disclose that no 
information can be given about the account holder due to the Data Protection Act.  
Nonetheless, customer service asks the third party to send the request in writing with 
the third party's ID.  This is then escalated to legal and responsible gaming in order 
to determine the best course of action, for example, contacting the customer 
proactively after a day to discuss his/her gambling.” 
 
“We agree that often indication by third parties had been helpful to identify potential 
problem gamblers. However indication by third parties has also been extremely 
misleading in some cases (we have even seen requests for third-party exclusion as 
harassment in ongoing divorce disputes). We therefore do not believe that naively 
accepting third-party exclusion requests would be reasonable (or constitutional). We 
have however introduced a process that allows intervention by third parties, while 
maintaining the rights of the player: 
1) Information by third party is accepted, third party is informed that due to privacy 
regulation we cannot confirm whether the person is our customer;  
2) Third party is however informed that we will investigate the case and approach the 
person, in case he is our customer; third party is asked whether they want to remain 
anonymous or whether they want to be mentioned, when we confront the player;3) If 
the person is our customer, we investigate the case, confront the player and demand 
explanation; and 4) If no or no sufficient explanation is provided, we take the right to 
impose exclusion on the player; this exclusion is however our decision based on our 
risk-management and our house right. It is not the direct consequence of the third-
party request.” 
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“…third-party concern can be listened to and interaction with that customer can then 
happen, but the process should always be player and operator driven together.” 
 
“We always consider third-party concerns, follow up and interact with the customer 
and ensure action is taken if appropriate.” 
 
“These options are available within our Policy.   It usually requires the individual to 
be spoken to first – as it is not unknown for a ‘concerned’ third party to be out of step 
with the reality and/or acting in their own self-interests or prejudices.    However, we 
reserve the right to enact an ‘enforced exclusion’ if it transpires that the third-party 
claim is correct but the individual does not accept it.” 
 
3.8 Self-exclusion by product  
 
One of the most controversial issues debated in gambling studies is 
whether different products have a variable potential to cause harm. There are 
various perspectives on this point: 
 
• variations in the form of gambling have little relevance over the form 
of gambling-related harm (LaPlante, et al., 2009; Griffiths & Auer, 
2012; Blaszczynski, 2013);  
• availability rather than form of gambling is more important (Abbott, 
Francis, Dowling,  & Coull, 2011); 
• the form of gambling is an important determinant of gambling-related 
harm (Orford, Griffiths, & Wardle, 2012; Parke & Griffiths, 2007). 
Preferences to limit exclusions to certain products may also be determined 
by individual (e.g., personality, motivation and preferences) and 
environmental (location, medium, accessibility) variables. However, there are 
currently no directly relevant studies examining this issue, and therefore 
research which explores player perspectives on harm minimisation strategy is 
required, of which the potential value of self-exclusion according to product 
should be a primary focus. 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – No consensus on exclusion by product 
 
Operators were split on this with half of respondents suggesting that such flexibility is 
important and the other half suggesting that half-measures would undermine a 
player’s attempt to minimise harm, and therefore they would seek to require a blanket 
ban across all products. 
 
“Based on the syndrome model of addiction, this could be a dangerous thing to do. 
While a customer might be encountering only problems with slot machines today, he 
might be encountering problems with other types of games after having ‘excluded 
from slots’ (=addiction hopping). Self-exclusion in its original meaning should 
therefore always aim to affect all types of games offered.” 
 
“Distinguishing between soft and hard gambling is very dangerous, a self-exclusion 
should be from all forms of gambling.” 
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Some operators suggested some products were identified for exclusion more 
frequently than other forms: 
 
“…very rarely do customers require sports gambling to be removed, it’s almost 
always casino and slots.”  
 
Observations were also made that this was easier in a remote setting: 
 
“Online this is easily achievable but, in retail, the exclusion has to be from the shop.  
It would be almost impossible for the shop team for it to be otherwise.” 
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Preference for flexibility in focus of ban 
 
One provider stated that this is becoming more acceptable: 
 
“The face of gambling has changed dramatically over the last few years and so has 
the face of the problematic gambler, so being able to exclude from forms of gambling 
they wish to exclude from or have identified are more of a risk to them would be very 
helpful”. 
 
3.9 Staff training and corporate culture 
 
Research from gambling jurisdictions suggests that whilst venue staff 
appear confident of protocol when customers actively seek information, there 
is often ambiguity regarding procedure and responsibility when staff observe 
customers clearly experiencing distress (Delfabbro, Borgas, & King, 2012; 
Hing & Nuske, 2011a; Hing & Nuske, 2011b; McCain, Tsai, & Bellino, 
2009).  Evidence suggests that part of the uncertainty of staff in engaging in 
customer intervention is uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of the process, 
and to what extent such intervention is perceived as a valued action by 
corporate management (Hing, 2007; Hing & Nuske, 2011a). Research clearly 
indicates that employees are in favour of further training in customer 
interaction in order to have clarification regarding procedures and 
responsibilities (Giroux, Boutin, Ladouceur, Lachance & Dufour, 2008; Hing, 
2007), and the Productivity Commission (2009) countenanced the case for all 
employees on the gaming floor to have such intervention training. 
Ultimately, evidence suggests that staff who underwent responsible 
gambling training to provide problem gambling and referral information, not 
only felt more confident and empowered to respond proactively to distressed 
customers, but were also more likely to intervene (Giroux et al., 2008; 
Ladouceur, Boutin, Doucet, Dumont, Provencher, Giroux et al., 2004).  
However, it is argued that management must more actively monitor customer 
intervention from floor staff, or online customer service staff, in terms of 
rewarding staff for effective interventions and potentially disciplining staff 
who did not respond appropriately in this respect (Kranacher, 2006; McCain 
et al., 2009).  Although it may not be feasible to evaluate with any accuracy 
the validity or effectiveness of staff judgements and actions regarding 
customer interactions, the underlying proposition was to create mechanisms to 
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demonstrate corporate support and commitment towards proactively 
providing problem gambling and referral information.  Research clearly 
demonstrates that employees’ perception of the ethical climate, via genuine 
managerial support, strongly influences whether they implement responsible 
gambling practices or not (Boo & Koh, 2001; McCain et al., 2009; Peterson, 
2002). 
Given the inherent challenges in proactively intervening and providing at-
risk customers with problem gambling and referral information, it is argued 
that efforts should be made to reduce potential barriers to customers self-
identifying themselves as experiencing problems and requiring assistance.  
Research indicates that lack of knowledge of available services is a primary 
barrier in customers seeking assistance (Hodgins & el Guebaly, 2000; 
McMillen et al., 2004; Rockloff & Schofield, 2004).  Further reported barriers 
to seeking assistance include a lack of trust regarding confidentiality, 
uncertainty regarding the processes that will be initiated once the customer 
self-identifies as experiencing gambling difficulties, and potential stigma 
(Hing, Holdsworth, Tiyce & Breen, 2014; Hing, Nuske, & Gainsbury, 2011; 
Rockloff & Schofield, 2004; Scull, Butler, Mutzleburg, 2003).  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that efforts should be concentrated on increasing 
awareness of what assistance is available on request, and assurances of 
confidentiality. 
Part of the reticence of employees in directly approaching a customer who 
has not self-identified is related to concern regarding hostile responses from 
customers who feel that their privacy is being invaded without their consent 
(Hing & Nuske, 2011a; 2011b).  As noted in previous studies, problem 
gamblers in the gambling environment are more likely to demonstrate 
negative emotional states such as anger and frustration (Delfabbro et al., 
2007; Schellinck & Schrans, 2004). The probable negative emotional 
disposition of problem gamblers is likely to make the interaction with the 
customer even more challenging.  Hing and Nuske (2011b) propose that 
attempts should be made to encourage a cultural shift, where gamblers are 
informed that displays of distress or problem gambling behavioural indicators 
will stimulate customer interaction from employees.  They propose a parallel 
is drawn to venue employees’ intervention when customers appear overtly 
intoxicated, where staff intervention is perceived as within their legitimate 
rights and responsibilities, rather than as an unnecessary intrusion.  However, 
it is fully acknowledged that creating support for, and acceptance of, such an 
ethical climate within gambling venues would require a considerable cultural 
shift emanating from significant public awareness campaigns (Hing & Nuske, 
2011b).   
 
Treatment Providers Survey – Cultural shift regarding the role of training 
 
“Staff should be better trained. Local and national helplines should be known by 
staff.” 
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“Staff need to be trained and made aware of the seriousness of an individual’s 
request to be excluded. I have heard of a person with dual diagnosis being ridiculed 
when requesting to self-exclude.” 
 
“Regular, up-to-date training for front line staff – betting shops, casinos – in areas 
concerning self-exclusion.” 
 
“In general the feedback from those self-excluding has been received well by well-
trained personnel but this still has room for improvement and more understanding.” 
 
There were isolated examples of very poor customer service reported by some 
treatment organisations, emphasising the importance of good staff training and the 
need for a strong culture of social responsibility within an organisation: 
 
“One gentleman relayed how he had gone in to self-exclude himself and the cashier 
didn’t know how to process his request and asked him to wait for the manager to 
come in or come back later. He decided to wait, gambled what money he had and left; 
the same cashier took his money and never said a word.” 
 
“Another experience discussed was that the cashier accepted his self-exclusion but 
said not to worry you can still come in and have your dinner and you can always 
change your mind and have a gamble if you like.” 
 
Gambling Operators Survey – Staff training an important basis for the provision 
of self-exclusion 
 
All of the operators agreed with the general principle, with some sectors or operations 
only focussing on staff where this constitutes a key part of their job (customer-facing 
staff, area managers). For example, a game designer or an odds compiler in a remote 
operation may not require a detailed knowledge of self-exclusion principles. 
 
“Training when it comes to responsible gaming at our company is split in various 
levels, and the self-exclusion process is mentioned in all the training.  Every customer 
service agent gets the RG training on policies and procedures (thus specifically 
covering self-exclusion step by step) on an annual basis.” 
 
3.10 Card-blocking as an adjunct to self-exclusion in some land-based 
venues 
 
Notwithstanding the absence of any empirical evidence, it was considered 
appropriate to make brief mention of a possible component measure that 
might merit consideration both in terms of operational practice and for further 
research. There may be potential to augment the provision of self-exclusion 
through allowing self-excluders to request blocking the use of debit or credit 
cards in land-based venues (where player identification and detecting 
breaches, particularly outside a ‘local area’, proves to be more difficult).   
In theory, this may be possible directly through the bank if merchant 
codes, identified as ‘gambling-related’, could be prohibited.   Alternatively, 
this might be feasible by direct agreement with gambling operators. Potential 
benefits of this option could be quick and easy implementation across venues 
at a regional or national level and a reduced chance of a breach; at least for 
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that specific payment method). There may also be a number of limitations 
with this approach, the most notable of which, is that gamblers would still be 
able to gamble using cash if they entered the venue undetected.  
A detailed consideration of this component measure and the various 
complexities regarding its merits, limitations and operational issues is beyond 
the scope of this review. However, evidence suggests that problem gamblers 
are more likely seek access to additional funds and make multiple 
withdrawals within a gambling session (McMillen, Marshall & Murphy, 
2004; Productivity Commission, 1999) and for this reason, exploring 
additional restrictions for self-excluders on ‘in-venue options’ for accessing 
additional funds warrants further examination. 
 
4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The theoretical basis for using self-exclusion as a harm minimisation tool 
is relatively unambiguous. Put simply, removing the opportunity to gamble 
from those who struggle with self-control in a gambling-related context will 
help minimise at least some gambling-related harm. However, the most 
efficient approach to implementation and enforcement, and to what extent this 
will reduce gambling-related harm, and who is likely to benefit most, are 
issues which continue to challenge stakeholders. 
From reviewing the literature, effective self-exclusion protocols should: 
 
• be actively but strategically promoted;  
• be quick and simple to implement;  
• be administered by staff  with relevant, up-to-date and regular 
training;  
• attract sufficient investment in resources and technology to improve 
enforcement;  
• have comprehensive (i.e. multi-site, multi-operator) rather than 
isolated coverage where feasible. 
 
However, work is needed to assess the operational feasibility and clinical 
implications of these recommendations, which in turn will yield important 
information regarding optimum strategy for delivery and function. When 
considering investment in different harm minimisation choices, what is most 
important is that those resources aimed at harm minimisation are used 
efficiently. Options which are expensive, difficult to implement and/or 
manage, offer minimal reductions on gambling-related harm and adversely 
affect the gambling experience (for those not experiencing harm) should be 
identified as inefficient with resources being diverted to more promising harm 
minimisation options. 
Consequently, self-exclusion is a very good idea in principle and likely to 
help reduce gambling-related harm when employed with other strategies: 
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however, the real challenge lies in establishing specific principles for efficient 
self-exclusion (e.g., promotion, duration, product focus, degree of flexibility 
etc.,) and making a judgement as to what proportion of spend on harm 
minimisation should be allocated to self-exclusion. 
In addition we draw the reader’s attention to the conclusions drawn in a 
recent broader review of operator-based approaches to harm minimisation 
(see Blaszczynski, Parke, Parke and Rigbye, 2014). Based on this review we 
also suggest that the following will likely be important in facilitating effective 
self-exclusion: 
 
• The at-risk player should be engaged, wherever possible, before 
significant harm is experienced. 
• Appropriate responsible gambling intervention training, with clear 
specification of staff responsibilities, should be put in place.  
• Self-exclusion strategies should be evaluated using robust research 
designs, adequately-sized samples, adequate outcome variables and 
follow-up measures. 
• Guidelines for self-exclusion should be prescriptive wherever possible 
(e.g., specifications regarding what constitutes a minimum acceptable 
level of ‘active promotion’). While the absence of empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of different approaches current limits the level of 
specificity that can be achieved, working groups involving multiple 
stakeholders should work together to develop principles in the interim 
period until the evidence-base catches up. 
 
5 RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR SELF-EXCLUSION 
 
Based on this review, we believe priorities for identifying best practice in 
self-exclusion relate to practical as well as theoretical examination. Initial 
priorities are suggested below. 
 
5.1 Ongoing assessment of options for Multi-Operator Self-Exclusion 
Schemes 
 
There is compelling justification for continuing to explore the 
opportunities for connecting self-exclusion across venues and operators. This 
should be a top priority for strengthening self-exclusion and harm 
minimisation more generally. Even among operators responding in the survey, 
an overwhelming majority was supportive of this strategy in principle, 
providing the barriers can be overcome. A detailed consideration of the 
technological, operational and legal issues that will constrain or otherwise 
shape the potential range of solutions is required. In addition, the most 
appropriate governance arrangements also need to be determined (i.e., 
regulator driven, player driven or operator driven).  
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Resolving these issues is likely to require ongoing consultation between 
stakeholders in the first instance, rather than traditional empirical research. 
Part of this feasibility work should include operational trials in relation to 
potential technology solutions to explore potential challenges documented by 
Dragicevic and colleagues. Such trials should involve the participation of 
multiple operators currently serving British citizens in order to test a solution 
over a reasonable timescale. This should allow potential barriers to be 
examined in a systematic and controlled way.  
 
5.2 Player survey on player behaviour and perspectives on self-exclusion 
 
A key conclusion from this review is that stakeholders require a better 
understanding of the potential costs and impacts of various approaches to the 
promotion and enforcement of self-exclusion in order to facilitate policy-
orientated decision-making. A relatively inexpensive and expedient first 
option would involve a survey seeking player perspectives on the likely 
uptake and impact of more innovative approaches to self-exclusion (e.g., 
disentitlement options, product-specific exclusion) and developing an 
improved understanding of post-exclusion behaviour (including continued 
gambling with other venues, different operators, different products or through 
different channels). This initial research could identify more promising areas 
to pilot some experimental research in order to obtain robust empirical 
evidence regarding costs and impact.  
 
5.3 Trialling optimal approaches for improving detection and preventing 
breaches 
 
It is also recommended that work identifying and trialling the most 
efficient approaches and technologies in the detection and enforcement of 
self-exclusion in land-based environments is carried out and documented. At 
the time of writing, trials examining the potential impact of facial recognition 
in detection and enforcement in the British gambling industry are under way 
in casinos (e.g., National Casino Forum) and adult entertainment centres (e.g., 
Praecepe). Identifying and exploring options for restricting debit and credit 
card use in land-based venues as a primary or adjunct facility to self-exclude 
may also hold promise. 
 
5.4 Identification of plausible harm 
 
As part of a broader programme of harm minimisation research, further 
studies should continue to explore the feasibility and accuracy of classifying 
gamblers who may be at risk or experiencing harm. If accurate and reliable 
identification is possible, then the promotion and implementation of self-
exclusion can be more targeted. We recommend that work in this area 
continues to be a priority including strategies such as drawing on observable 
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behavioural indicators overtly displayed by individuals, as well as extending 
investigations beyond gaming machines to other forms of gambling.   
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